A nuanced and compassionate understanding of Rohingya’s flight is the need of the hour

The presence of Rohingya community within India is progressively becoming an issue of political blame-game and some political actors are busy pedalling mass anxiety without factoring in the complex multiplicity of vectors related to the issue, including the growing importance of the issue globally. Thus it is creating a situation where the presence of Rohingyas is becoming a manifestation of classic tale of poor and illegal immigrants in global north or global south as they are vilified and blamed for the rise in crime. They are dehumanised and subjected to dog-whistle tactics of mainstream politicians to induce mass anxiety.

In Uttar Pradesh, in July 2023, the police had reportedly detained 74 Rohingya Muslims — 55 men, 14 women, and five minors — in 2023. Now, in Muslim majority former State of J&K , the BJP recently gave a new turn to the issue by appealing to J&K Lt. Governor Manoj Sinha to initiate a CBI probe into the rising number of Rohingyas and Bangladeshi settlers in J&K. It termed their settlement as a major “political conspiracy”. They have accused the ruling National Conference government of protecting the settlers by providing them with power and water connections because they were members of a “particular community.” The J&K Chief Minister Omar Abdullah, who assumed office only in October, 2024, urged the central government to formulate a clear policy to determine the fate of the Rohingyas in the Union Territory, terming the condition to be a ‘humanitarian dispute’. He reportedly said, “The central government should decide what to do about them. If they can be sent back, they should be sent back. But if we cannot send them back, we cannot let them starve or freeze to death.” Stating that the Rohingyas must be treated with “dignity”, the Chief Minister said, “They are human beings and must not be treated like animals.”

In the national capital, within the same time-frame as the Delhi Assembly elections approach, the AAP accused the BJP of orchestrating a conspiracy to bring and settle Rohingya refugees in Delhi. AAP leader Manish Sisodia had reportedly referred to Minister Hardeep Puri’s social media post on August 17, 2022, where he reportedly announced the relocation of Rohingya refugees to EWS flats in Delhi’s Bakkarwala area. In the social media post, Minister Puri had said, “India has always welcomed those who have sought refuge in the country. In a landmark decision, all Rohingya refugees will be shifted to EWS flats in Bakkarwala, Delhi. They will be provided basic amenities, UNHCR IDs, and round-the-clock Delhi Police protection.”

In this season of points scoring over Rohingya presence in India, multi-dimensional nuances related with the community both at the national, regional and global levels, including the historical context which has deep connections with India, are being ignored. A key argument in support of their deportation is that their stay in India may endanger national security. However, there is no evidence to this effect, a fact underlined by security officials, including in the sensitive region of J&K. The number of Rohingyas living outside, particularly in Bangladesh, as stateless population, is more than two million which is four times that of those who are in that country. As per the Arakan Project, in 2019-20, the approximate number of Rohingyas living in Bangladesh, Saudi Arabia, Pakistan, India, the UAE and Malaysia was 9,47,000, 5,00,000, 3,50,000, 40,000, 50,000 and 1,50,000, respectively. Bangladesh hosts the maximum of number of refugees and they have come to the country in several phases. The most recent was in August 2017 as 720000 Rohingyas were expelled from Rakhine in Myanmar on account of the army’s allegedly disproportionate use of force after attacks by the Arakan Rakhine Salvation Army on military’s posts. The magnitude of the displacement in 2017 can be gauged from the fact that Maungdaw district, comprising the townships of Maungdaw and Buthidaung, with a population of over 7,50,000 Rohingyas, witnessed a near-total exodus.

The issue requires unpacking within its regional as well as broader context. Within the subcontinent, in actual terms, the presence of Rohingya is nothing new. They had been migrating from Myanmar in the last three-decades and the trigger for the migration of the Rohingyas is persecution. To understand the problems of statelessness of the Rohingyas, one has to factor in the contestations of history, identity, colonialism and conceptualisation of modern-day nationhood. Myanmar’s version is that the Rohingyas came from Bangladesh to Rakhine and their language is Chittagonian, which has similarities with Bengali. Myanmar calls Rohingyas ‘Bengalis’, which goes against the universally agreed right of the community to ‘self-identify’. It is said that the British, when they gained control of Rakhine, facilitated the flight of the Rohingyas as sharecroppers. The community contests this version. Its members affirm that they are native to Rakhine and have a distinct language.

In this battle of versions, little attention is paid to the fact that till the British empire imploded in 1947-48 in Myanmar and India and new nation-states were created, including Myanmar and East Pakistan (which became Bangladesh in 1971), the border between the coastal Rakhine and neighbouring Bangladesh’s Chittagong district was porous. The seeds of the exclusionary citizenship project in Myanmar, which directly impacted Rohingyas, were sowed by General Ne Win, a military dictator who ruled the country from 1962 to 1981. General Ne Win’s administration identified 135 national races of Myanmar, excluding the Rohingya. Building on that, his successor President San Yu passed a citizenship law in 1982. The law recognised three categories of citizens, namely, citizen, associate citizen and naturalised citizen. Full citizenship is granted to the descendants of residents who lived in Myanmar prior to 1823 or were born to parents who were citizens at the time of birth. 1824 is the year when the first Anglo-Burmese war took place. Associate citizens are those who acquired citizenship through the 1948 Union Citizenship Law. Naturalised citizens are those who lived in Myanmar before January 4, 1948, the date of the country’s independence, and applied for citizenship after 1982. Thus Rohingyas were stripped of citizenship rights in 1982 and thus started more than four decades of institutionalized discrimination and oppression.

The 2008 Constitution drafted and promulgated by the military is still in operation and it has 135 national races enshrined. The authorities in Myanmar argue that the Rohingya are not a distinct ethnic group and that they are ‘Bengalis’. However, facts demonstrate that the Rohingya were once part and parcel of the country’s political and electoral landscape. A Rohingya leader, who had been a Member of Parliament, had even served as a federal minister in the early 1960s. Till 2010, the Rohingya even participated in national elections, though they were declared non-citizens in 1982. It was only in 2015 that the authorities took away their voter cards. Facing criticism, including at the Security Council and General Assembly, President Thein Sein and his successor Aung Sung Suu Kyi’s National League for Democracy’s governments often cited the national verification card (NVC) process as their commitment to grant citizenship to anyone who fulfilled any of the three criterion. However, there was a catch as the Rohingya could only declare themselves as ‘Bengalis’ as Myanmar does not accept the Rohingya as an ethnic group. The 2014 census failed to officially enumerate the Rohingya as they boycotted the exercise. The fact is that the anti-Rohingya narrative of several decades created a situation where even a seemingly democratic and liberal party like the ruling National League for Democracy (NLD) exacerbated the situation of Rohingyas. The NLD oversaw two phases of violent expulsions of Rohingyas in 2016 and 2017.

In the present context, keeping in mind the complicated and turbulent past, there is little doubt that the problem of Rohingyas has also coincided with a surge in territorial nationalism and Islamophobia that has swept across the globe. In Myanmar, the new official narrative promoted a binary history, which was internalised, including the idea of natives and foreigners, by the Burman Buddhist majority. In a country of multiplicities in terms of ethnicity and religion, internal strife became a way of life, including among adherents of Buddhist majority of different ethnicities such as Rakhine Buddhists as a result of the enforcement of the singular national vision of the majority. The Rohingyas, who are cent per cent Muslim and with their own ethnicity, stood little chance of being included in such a polity. The Myanmar military has often invoked the threat of Rohingyas to gain political legitimacy and the ruling political elite is always insecure about adopting a liberal, accommodating approach towards the Rohingyas as this would potentially invite the wrath of the majority.

The Myanmar leadership, be it the military or political, consistently deny the claim that they are anti-Muslim. They cite the recognition of the Kaman Muslims as one of the indigenous ethnic groups listed in the Constitution. In the post-2010 elections — catalysed by many variables, including the availability of greater right to free expression in the backdrop of the ongoing democratic transition that also unleashed old stereotypes against the Rohingya in the public domain — the citizenship project played out differently on the ground. In 2012, a case of sexual violence and murder of a Rakhine Buddhist woman sparked off inter-communal violence in Sitwe, central Rakhine, that led to internal displacement of both communities, including 1,20,000 Rohingya. Belying the claims of the authorities, the animosity against the Rohingya had morphed into Islamophobia across the country and not just Rakhine. Extremist Buddhist monk Wirathu became a symbol of hate as he peddled vitriol against the Muslims. Islamophobia became the trend among the vast swathes of the Buddhist community. A number of inter-communal riots took place across the country in 2013. In Meiktila, situated in central Myanmar, more than 40 people were killed. There was inter-communal violence in Yangon and Lashio of Shan state, situated in the north. The ruling political elite become even more rigid and shunned any accommodation. In fact, when the then United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) António Guterres, who is now the UN Secretary-General, met President Thein Sein in July 2012, the President stated that his government was prepared to hand over the Rohingya to the UNHCR and then they can resettle the ethnic group in any third country “that are willing to take them.”

Coming to the subcontinent, more than twenty-three-years ago, the author remembers, while reporting for this paper, it was common for the Border Security Force (BSF) to send press releases about the arrest of “Myanmarese” citizens. Many times, political reporters were taken to meet “Myanmarese” along the India-Pak international border in J&K and there was no mention of their Rohingya identity. In the press release, there was explicit mention of the fact that they were caught by the BSF for crossing over to adjoining Sialkot district of Pakistan which adjoins the plains of J&K. The issue got little notice nationally as there was an acceptance to the fact that they were attempting to crossover to Pakistan as desperate economic migrants with the purpose to migrate to the Middle East. In fact, one of the terrorist attacks on slum dwellers by Lashkar on 13th July 2002 in the plains of J&K took place in the same area where Rohingyas are presently living. On the ground zero, various interviews of Rohingyas by the author in the last four-years suggest many of the Rohingyas have refugee cards issued by UNHCR. They are even routinely hired and preferred by local contractors to work as masons and labourers for municipality work as they charge less than the market rates.

Within India, there is an ongoing litigation between Mohammad Salimullah vs Union of India, where the apex court has to decide whether the deportation of Rohingyas will violate the right to equality under Article 14 and also Article 21 of the Constitution, which upholds the right to life. In March 2024, the Central Government had told the Supreme Court that illegal Rohingyas did not have the fundamental right to reside and settle in India and that New Delhi did not recognise refugee cards issued by the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees. The Rohingya case cannot be divorced from the community’s institutionalised victimisation. This aspect is critical to the ongoing litigation and will clarify India’s refugee policy, which will have international consequences as well. In an interim order, the SC said in April 2021 that Articles 14 and 21 were guaranteed to all, irrespective of citizenship. However, the court added: “The right not to be deported is ancillary or concomitant to the right to reside or settle in any part of the territory of India guaranteed under Article 19(1)(e).” This meant that Article 19(1)(e) only applied to Indian citizens. The court further ordered that unless the procedure prescribed for such deportation is followed, it cannot be undertaken.

While there is no universal definition of migrants, as per the UN, refugees are people who have fled their countries to escape conflict, violence or persecution and have sought safety in another country. In line with the universally acknowledged ‘refugee protection regime’, the authorities as well as civil society should ensure that xenophobia is avoided with respect to the Rohingyas. International norms dictate that no one can be deported without informed consent. The Centre has stated that the deportation process will follow the procedure of notifying the government of the country of origin of the foreigners and the deportation will be ordered only when confirmed by that government that the persons concerned are citizens/nationals of that country and that they are entitled to come back. Practically, the same procedure is being followed for non-Rohingya Myanmar refugees living in Manipur, who escaped after the 2021 coup. The first batch was deported from India in the first quarter of 2024. For all practical purposes, even if this procedure is adhered to, the Rohingya deportation is subject to the Myanmar Government’s consent, which is an unlikely scenario.

Obviously, the main impediment stalling repatriation is the demand by Rohingyas for the full recognition of their political, social and economic rights that no one in Myanmar is willing to concede. As per the international humanitarian norms, the return should be a fully informed and voluntary decision with enabling conditions. The ongoing case also cannot be delinked from the litigation on the Citizenship Amendment Act (CAA). Except the clause on religion, the Rohingyas fulfil the criterion of persecution mentioned in the CAA. The apex court will also have to reconcile Article 21 and Article 19(1)(e) in its final order. This will determine whether refugees coming to India will have legal recourse like they do in some Western democracies or their stay/deportation will solely depend on the executive’s discretionary powers. Meanwhile, within camps in Cox’s Bazar, Bangladesh, the situation is becoming more and more challenging for the authorities. Many have expressed the risk that because of depressing status quo ante there is a potential of radicalisation in the midst of poverty and a situation of hopelessness, particularly among the youth, as incidents of violence and fatalities increase as a result of intra-camp feuds.

Burdened by previous experiences of forced expulsion, particularly in 1978 and in 1991-92, a feeling of despondency lurks among the Rohingya community about the various international initiatives being taken in the context of accountability, justice and repatriation efforts being pursued after the 2017 crisis. A fatigue also prevails in the international community as efforts towards repatriation have achieved little success. It is obvious that a sustainable resolution of the Rohingya crisis is predicated upon support for current efforts to create a democratic and federal polity in Myanmar along with the simultaneous pursuit of accountability for human rights violations. Rohingyas will only be accepted in a democratic, inclusive, federal Myanmar.

Within the multilateral arena, Myanmar is facing trial at the International Court of Justice (ICJ) for an alleged genocide, apart from being the subject of several human rights reports and mechanisms at the United Nations. The International Court of Justice (ICJ) is hearing the Rohingya genocide case (The Gambia vs Myanmar) whereas in November 2024  an arrest warrant had been filled by the International Criminal Court (ICC) Prosecutor Karim Khan against Senior General Min Aung Hlaing, Commander-in-Chief of Myanmar’s armed forces and Acting President, alleging his involvement in crimes against humanity targeting the Rohingya population. Considering their large presence in South Asia, South East Asia and West Asia as refugees, the situation of Rohingyas is a humanitarian problem and it has often been stressed that they require a concerted engagement among the relevant host countries to evolve a common strategy in their engagement with Myanmar about their long-term status.

Keeping in mind the wider global interest in the community, the intent and shrill narrative by the political actors to deport the Rohingyas is an empty rhetoric and will worsen the state of affairs. As half of the 10 elected members of UNSC will be from the Organisation of Islamic Cooperation (OIC) in 2025, Rohingya issue will be one of the critical agenda items. With the forcible deportation of a community universally recognised as one of the most persecuted an unlikely prospect, political stakeholders should desist from perpetuating a state of mass-scale anxiety against the community as it harms the country’s image. In fact, as one of the leaders of the global south, India should take a lead in constituting a consortium of host countries to address the multifold challenges facing the Rohingyas, including formulating innovative solutions for the community members. This would enable them to work legally and also address the concerns of law enforcement authorities in the host countries. This includes the proposal of Saudi Arabia of the issuance of permanent residency. Some of the Gulf countries, which now have good relations with India, may be willing to join India to fund this consortium, and this can provide a template for similarly persecuted refugees and their host countries elsewhere. There is also the proposal of settlement of a few refugees in western countries willing to accept them as part of their overall asylum policy. This is obviously not a panacea to the basic lingering conceptual problem of their statelessness and the rights of the vast majority of Rohingyas living both within Myanmar and outside.

Rather than attracting international attention by uncalled statements and acts that may be seen as victimizing the victims, Indian political elite as well as political stakeholders should contribute to a more compassionate understanding of Rohingya’s flight from Myanmar globally. Because of the history and geography, ideally, India should be more aware of the nuances of the challenges facing the Rohingya community. As mentioned above, it could also further facilitate global and regional efforts aimed at evolution of an innovative solution-oriented approaches to the challenges facing the community. This would cement India’s image as an effective global south leader that has an ability to craft viable sustainable and humane solutions to global challenges.

The author was an a member of the UN Secretary-General’s Good Offices on Myanmar.